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TWO BASIC CONCEPTIONS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 
BERNARD CIIECHTERMAN 
University of Miami 
Introdu ction 
A recurring theme in the contemporary literature of international politic s 
and foreign policy analysis concerns itse lf with attempts to identify the curr nt 
and futur e tatus of systemic politic in the world arena. The prevailing view 
see the international political syst m (IP ) of the pr esen t and the immediat e 
pastonth verg ofbreakupandreplac m ntbyan ewo ne. taminimumthe 
iew i that a major realignment is in the offering. To determine the accuracy 
of such an assertion i provocation enough to engage in some form of analysi of 
today's IPS and its apparent trends . It is al o my contention that such an 
xploration will reward the student with a significant insight and persp ctive 
on th natur of the IPS , a nece ssary objective in its own right. 
In s eking to id ntify the curr nt and future status of the IPS , the inves-
tigator is invariably confronted by th exist nee of two fundam ntally 
dichotomous conceptions of the natur e of th system: a Hobbe sian and a 
Lockean. This discovery in itself is important as a consid ration for analyzing 
any gen ral a sertion as to the chang s in the old and emergenc of a n w 
IP . How much of any of the conclusions are attributable to th bias ofone of 
th se vi ws rather than a careful accumulation, analysis and validating of data 
about th IP ? 
There are of course a multiplicity of conceptions of the IP , but they all 
deriv their in piration from the two basic views cited. The two views, 
regardless of the nomenclatur e emplo ed, have time-immemorial in flu need 
the cl scriptions, analy es, and prescriptions offered by academicians and 
public officials for the IPS . The con eptualizations have b n employed 
som time consciously, sometimes unconsciously , and sometimes only on the 
basis of a partial awareness, even by methodologically-oriented p op! . Driv-
en to their respective extreme they b come irreconcilable; offered in care-
fully qualified fa hion th re emerges some similarities and areas of ov rlap . 
Each conception has been the product of considerab le intellectualizing and/or 
emotionalism, the distinction between the supporting efforts frequently lost 
due to the inten ity of ubsequent personal commitment. 
The Dichotomoits Conc eption s of the JPS: A Hobb esian View 
To facilitate the identification ofth Hobbesian View, it should be thought 
of as synonymous with "ordered Anarchy ." The term is intended to conv ya 
position on an IPS continuum as predominantly anarchic but subject to 
ongoing efforts to organize and stabilize the world, including ome successful 
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past achievements. The invocation of Hobbes' name is somewhat misleading 
unless identification is made with his classical concept of the "state of war" in 
his writings. The reference here avoids Hobbes' ultimate solution, "ab-
solutism," to achieve stability in public relationships. The contemporary 
Hobbesian excerpts the "state of war" aspect, stressing by analogy the funda-
mental shortcomings and inherent limitations of man's nature as fostering a 
permanent, ongoing social conflict in all human relationships. This assump-
tion in turn becomes an underlying premise for further development of the 
Hobbesian conception of the IPS. 
Human frailty, the starting point for theorizing, is usually inferred , com-
pelling a reader to discern this suppositional thread appearing throughout the 
conceptualization. Those Hobbesians 1 who begin with an outspoken admis-
sion of their "human nature theory" have consistently attracted the interested 
student's attention as a basis for serious intellectual endeavor, whether for 
reasons of agreement or disagreement. 
In addition to the fundamental causality attributed to the nature of man, 
the Hobbesian also focuses on the vagaries and uncertainties inhering in the 
IPS as well as the internal dynamics of individual societies that are linked to 
external behavior. It is these assumptions and systemic features that preoc-
cupy Hobbesians in every day analysis and are used to validate their overview. 
In recent history the Hobbesian View has been identified with "Realism" 
as an interpretation of international politics. In the writings of advocates -;nd 
critics, synonyms such as "realpolitik, machtpolitik, power politics, Biblical 
realism, etc.," have been employed to characterize the viewpoints as well as to 
convey the central concepts. Students of the IPS must recognize that 
similarities among such views does not guarantee that each one truly repre-
sents a Hobbesian View. Too often they may reflect distorted variations 
derived from that basic conception. 2 
In an American context, the Hobbesian View has been the exceptional 
.rather than the predominant interpretation of the IPS. Any overview of the 
intellectual traditions that have governed American thinking about the IPS 
evidence an overwhelming commitment to the alternative Lockean View. 
Aside from those moments of attentiveness shown "the founding fathers" 
(most particularly Alexander Hamilton), some influential advocates at the tum 
of the 19th-20th centuries (Mahan, T. Roosevelt), and some writers and 
policy-makers of the immediate post-World War Two period (Niebuhr, Ken-
nan, Morgenthau, etc.), the Hobbesian View has held little sway in American 
behavior. Of course a prominent foreign affairs commentator, Walter 
Lippmann, sought to provide an ongoing dialogue for this view throughout 
20th Century America. Significantly, the previously cited moments of Hobbe-
sian influence coincide with an intense and broad American activism in the 
1Niebuhr , Morgenthau , Kennan , Lefever, etc. 
2 Especially is this true for the view labelled "protracted conflict , .. a form of deterministic or 
Lockean idealism popularly called "romantic conservatism.'" 
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IPS. The multifaceted activism spurred on by the Hobbe ians has never 
precluded some specific forms of activism inspired by the Lockean View, 
incorporating them in their overall conception of the IPS. 
The Hobbesian View of the contemporary IPS can be briefly summarized 
in terms of five attributes, their corollary dynamics and ramifications. Simply 
stated they are: 1) the absence of any central governance; 2) a multiplicity of 
goals sought by the participants and best fulfilled by a general strategy (see # 
5); 3) the prevalency and continuity of heterogeneity among the participants ; 
4) a multiplicity of strategies and techniques available to participants to 
achieve their goals; and 5) a reliance on "eq uilibrium politics " as the best 
control system (strat egy) by which to attain and sustain goal fulfillment in the 
IPS . 
By the absence of any central governance the Hobbesian describes on the 
one hand the non-existence of a single, world-wide authoritative, legitimate 
decision-making and enforcing body in the IPS . By contrast, the Hobbesian 
describes the situation of innumerable centers of authority as proof of a 
dec entralized governance system. The lack of a single authority to foster and 
compel obedience has the effect of only guaranteeing each state's command 
over their own internal policy-making process and simultaneously denying 
them absolute control over external behavior beyond their immediate juris-
diction. 
The variety of actors, combinations, and recombinations occurring and 
possible in any IPS varies with different periods of history , although one actor 
form predominates with consistency as the key unit for explaining behavior 
over any extended period of time. For past historical eras central dominant 
actors have been clans , tribal units , city-states, or other types of principalities . 
The contemporary Hobbesian cites "the territorial state" as the most signifi-
cant actor today and for the foreseeable future. Recognizing that novel actor 
formation is always occurring in an existing IPS supports the contention that 
there are varieties of participants and that the JPS is always in a state of flux (or 
potential transformation ). 
The contemporary IPS is described by an elaborate typology of actors 
dominated by the most numerous form , the territorial state, commonly refer-
red to as the "nation-state." The current IPS is usually anointed by the title of 
"the western nation-state system" because of its European-based origin in the 
17th-18th centuries. Because of the fewness in number of actual nation-states 
in the world today , meaning a coincidence of a national identity conscious 
population with a distinct geographical territory , the unit represents more of 
an aspirational goal than reality for the states in the IPS . The appropriate term 
under these circumstances is the legal or political developmental status term 
"the territorial state." 
The current IPS also includes other actors such as "sub-national units," 
"regional or supranational units," " coalitions or alliances,"" dependent areas," 
and intergovernmental organizations (IGO 's). 
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The Hobbesian usually differentiates between the authoritative-
legptimizing segments of the population as the true functionaries in the IPS in 
contrast with the larger and more passive general populace. For the Hobbe-
sian , all the earlier versions of the IPS were featured by an emphatically rigid 
separation between leaders and the public in external role-playing. In the 
current JPS , though accepting the gap as still pronounced for the great 
majority of states, the influence of the public has risen to a new prominence. 
The public now provides the "tolerable limits " beyond which policy-makers 
may not stray , or they face the consequences of either being toppled from rule 
or with the reduced prospects of an effective implementation of their policy 
choices. Past Hobbesians are prone to lament over the rise of the common 
man , whereas contemporists merely caution against any excessive reliance on 
public opinion as a factor compounding the difficulties of rational policy-
making , producing an emotional roller coaster effect on external behavior . 
With the presence of so many actors , the Hobbesian cites the ad infinitum 
number of relationships that do or can potentially exist, negating the prospects 
of conclusive calculations and choices . At any given moment the actor is 
engaged in bilateral , multilateral , hierarchical, committal, and transitory 
relationships, as well as being confronted by the alternative possibilities 
provided by each of these. 
A ramification of the open-endedness of the JPS produces a consistent 
insecurity for each actor , compelling them to focus on the inexactness of 
payoffs regardless of what policies are adopted vis-a-vis others. Under these 
uncertainties, a "worst case " frame of analysis is adopted for each relationship , 
dictating overly cautious behavior, primarily self-reliance, and great skepti-
cism about the prospects of momentous changes in the IPS. The preoccupa-
tion with flux conditions and inability to predict developments in the JPS 
produces the moral imperative to preserve the actor at all costs , a criterion by 
which all subsequent behavior is then judged. With this basic concern under-
lying all prescriptive policies, the actor must engage in a constant competitive 
struggle in all areas of human behavior to maximize survival. Survival is 
viewed as more likely when predominantly self-reliant as opposed to being 
dependent on other actors, although the latter remains a tactical option under 
negative IPS circumstances. 
In developing the second attribute of the IPS , the Hobbesian views the 
numerous actors as expressive of a tremendous variety of goals that further 
condition and determine their very survival. Nationalism is accepted as the 
primary driving force to create and sustain actors. Other "cultural support" 
bases for actor formation have severely limited prospects for replacing what 
has been viewed the key energy force for 300 years in western societies and is 
being emulated today in the non-western world. For the Hobbesian the 
failure of this dominant loyalty-authority pattern to meet the needs of the 
actors would lead to a new "cultural support" base , and probably organiza-
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tional basis, to fulfill satisfactions. This view would sustain the Hobbesian 
belief in the open-ended condition of the IPS and the abilities to transform 
itself as necessity demands. For the foreseeable future the Hobbesian does 
not anticipate any departure from the present dominance of the territorial 
state unit. The reasoning is based on 1) the paradoxical nature of nationalism 
serving simultaneously as a unifying force (at the territorial level ) and a 
fragmenting force (within the territorial level and in external interactions), 
and 2) the need for nationalism to run its course as a fulfilled aspiration in the 
more numerous "developing nations " of the world which currently lack its 
pervasive impact , especially analogous to the older actors. 
Despite a lack of uniformities among actors the essentialness of meeting a 
vast number of needs creates a condition of interdependency for everyone 
with at least someone else. Therefore actor behavior has a penetrating or 
impinging effect on the internal affairs of other participants in the IPS. This 
tendency , in the final analysis , denies any actor a realistic choice of decision-
making in terms of purely domestic considerations. 
A further consequential outgrowth of this actor interdependency is an 
awareness that the very factors supporting their creation and survival are 
simultaneously sources of their vulnerabilities vis-a-vis one another. To 
adequately meet the actor 's goals demands his perception of changing needs 
and priorities produced by both domestic and external factors , as well as a 
constant resort to multifaceted domestic and external managerial and col-
laborative efforts. Mismanagement of internalities in the society could un-
dermine the unity and support of the public or cause the authorities grave 
concern that another actor might favorably exploit them to his advantage in 
their relationships . To the Hobbesian it is evident that a unified society stands 
a bette~ chance of successfully conducting its external relations as well as 
buffering itself against any outside penetrations. It is equally obvious that for a 
divided society the dangers on both these counts increases immeasurably up 
to the ultimate prospect of complete subversion of the entire state. Failure to 
comprehend this whole situation would negate the prospects of an actor 
reaching his goals or even worse, injuring his security prospects . 
To the Hobbesian the fallible and dual nature of men fails to guarantee 
either a correct or absolute perception of their needs , thereby intensifying 
their insecurities in externally-directed behavior. Internalities being diverse 
in number and possibly misperceived, forces the actor a) to pursue cautious 
and delimited external behavior to avoid damaging greatly the internal needs , 
b) not to resort to the wrong techniques for their policy implementations, and 
c) to avoid incorrect commitments abroad. Considerable risk-taking and an 
overly optimistic view of outcomes in the IPS suffer as a result of these 
considerations. 
In explaining the third attribute of the current IPS, the Hobbesian asserts 
the primacy of a "cultural relativistic world." The external heterogeneity of 
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actors reflects the significance of nationalism or parochialisms as the key factor 
producing unit differentiation in the IPS. Because nationalism is based on a 
combination of distinct historical, psychic and geographic factors , it produces 
a consciousness and behavior pattern for territorial states biased in behalf of 
these internalities. Effective leadership within each territory must cope with 
the chauvinistic overtones of this phenomenon by attempting to channel or 
control it for success in external relations. The best tactic seems to be a 
lip-service acquiescence while modifying it to accord with needs and systemic 
circumstances in the IPS that contradict its exclusive concern. The Hobbesian 
ends up stressing the critical nature of internal dynamics, governmental and 
cultural, as setting the tolerable limits for any leadership, but also a cause and 
sustaining factor in interstate conflict in• the IPS. 
A critical ramification of the heterogeneous nature of the external world is 
that its pervasiveness, paramountcy, and continuity, must serve as the start-
ing point in the state's efforts at foreign policy analysis and choices. An equally 
important corollary must be the actor's recognition of the unresolvability of 
state differences in any absolute sense. Accommodations, agreements , and 
solutions are accepted as temporary at best, subject to considerable fluctua-
tions caused by changing internalities and externalities. Differences persist 
because of cultural and physical distinctions as well as inherent shortcomings 
and limitations of actors. The Hobbesian concludes that conflictual behavior 
flows from these fundamental factors as well as consequential misperceptions , 
inadequate responses, communication breakdowns, and calculated or delib-
erate contradictory behavior by actors. 
A fourth essential ingredient of the contemporary conception of the IPS 
recognizes the availability of a multiplicity of strategies and techniques by 
which actors may achieve their goals. Every aspect of human endeavor is 
viewed as a basis for interaction and interpenetration by one actor of another 
to induce favorable results. The Hobbesian supports this likelihood by citing 
the .typological similarities of internalities, that is physical and human re-
source capabilities and of "will." While varying from actor to actor in their 
specifics, ultimately they are the calculated bases for broad strategy formation 
and choices of technique in implementing external policies. This view is 
adopted whether initiating, altering, or sustaining an existing relationship. 
The classification scheme for both strategies and techniques may vary from 
one Hobbesian to another, but they generally agree as to distinguishable 
categories such as political, economic, psychological, ideological, legal, mili-
tary, and cultural factors. Classification efforts do prove that considerable 
standardization exists and is so accepted by the actors in the IPS. However, 
standardization in the long run is subject to change reflecting the dynamic 
qualities of the factors. The revision of previous typologies of strategies and 
techniques is either due to deliberateness or the uncertainties of actors 
operating in the IPS. Current examples include the deliberate misuse of 
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semantical commonalities to gain at the expense of other actors, or the dubiety 
over the strategic ramifications that flow from changes in the nuclear delivery 
technology . Variations and new emphases in strategies and techniques 
employed are constantly dep endent upon a variety of inputs , resource 
capabilities and leve ls of will, available. Actors on both sides of any continuum 
of "have" and "have not " capabi liti es must adjust their strategies and 
techniques according to these prevailing circumstances. 
Since strategy formation and techniqu e utilization are dependent on 
capabilities available to the actor, they seek to maximize capability develop-
ment in order to enhance their range offlexible choices and effectiveness with 
regard to goal attainment. o actor, according to the Hobbesian , ever posses-
ses a sufficient reservoir of capabilities to facilitate any strategy it wants. Each 
actor stands in a relative or delimited position of capabilities vis-a-vis other 
actors, dictating a need to ascertain their respective differences and what 
strategies and techniques are most feasible under these circumstances. Gen-
era lly the Hobbesian insists that the actor with the greater relative capabilities 
is in a superior position to influence and/or achieve its objectives. Historical 
record has demonstrated the reverse is equally true . 
The Hobbesian admits that throughout the course of history there have 
been misperceptions by actors. Efforts to go beyond an actor's capabi lities, a 
strategy of bluff, usually lead to poor results because someone always refuses 
to submit to such chicanery. Unconscious behavior that leads to errors are 
attributed to the inherent shortcomings of man or a lack of awareness. Al-
though not assuredly resulting in the devastation of the actor, persistent errors 
in calculations and policy choices, have a damaging impact on the security 
and/or relative independence of actors. To the Hobbesian , fluidity in the 
typology of influential factors and their relative impact in the IPS , force the 
actor to exercise a constant vigilance and reaction pattern to enhance or even 
sustain their very existence. Attempts to rigidify strategies or techniques as 
permanent , or to disregard them altogether, have usually led to the downfall 
of actors in history. 
From the Hobbesian perspective the most extreme technique available for 
use is organized violence, the ttftima ratio , commonly referred to as military 
power. Existing military power can be employed either as a threat or as an 
operationalized technique to achieve specific objectives vis-a-vis another 
actor. Its very existence, proper deployment , plus the "will" to employ 
military power , has the paradoxical effect of bringing about its nonutilization 
or at worst a minimal application in an interacting relationship. The "will" to 
employ such capability is critical and is commonly conceived of as conveying 
the image of"credibility." Without it the greatest collection of military might 
is rather meaningless. If employed intelligently in conjunction with other 
techniques , or as the ultimate backup to the more pacific techniques , the 
Hobbesian anticipates less dysfunctions and breakdowns in the IPS. 
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The overriding shortcomings of men and actors make total avoidance of 
contradictions or breakdowns inconceivable . Because the variety of pos-
sibilities range from minor contradictions to major breakdowns among actors, 
military capabilities must be equal to each task. Survival as well as helping 
reconstitute new security relationships are at stake. The Hobbesian insists on 
the use of a delimited and calculated organized violence only in behalf of the 
security objective in the IPS. This consistent awareness is also emphasized to 
avoid misconstruing the technique as an end instead of as a means towards 
achieving security in the IPS. The increased concern with organized violence, 
due to the growth of its destructiveness , reenforces the Hobbesian insistence 
on its proper management and the appreciation of its concurrent limitations. 
The maximum form of violence, nuclear warfare, is viewed as having consid-
erable limitations because of its inherent destructiveness and prevailing spa-
tial cond itions between actors. Despite this , the Hobbesian in recognizing 
technological change as the basic law of life, refuses to absolutize this as a 
permanent situation for the contemporary IPS. Some writers insist that the 
nuclear era is but in its infancy as of now. 
Although actors desire to preoccupy themselves with one particular 
technique or strategy, usually military or economic, the Hobbesian critiques 
this overre liance severely. Individual man and the actors are viewed as having 
innumerable needs which correctly perceived militate against such singular 
dependency or outlook. Successful participation in the JPS requires the actor 
to operate on the basis of multiple techniques and strategies. All are interre -
lated on a continuum permitting optional choices, momentary emphases, 
combinations, and intensities of application. 
The Hnal ingredient of the Hobbesian conception of an IPS is for the actors 
to rely on "equilibrium politics" as the best management strategy to attain and 
sustain goal fulfillment. The key goal of any actor, prerequisite to any other, is 
the maximization of security, a relative and dynamic rather than an absolute 
posture. Security becomes synonymous with such conditions as survival, 
continuity, independence , internal sovereignty, or the preservation of one's 
own decision-making abilities. Additional actor objectives, specifically in-
tended to meet particular needs, can only be met in the course of or after the 
fulfillment of the priority goal of security. The Hobbesian rules out any 
particularistic approach, such as invoking moral or legal precepts , at organiz-
ing and contro lling the IPS as inadequate to the comp lexities, diversities , and 
uncertainties in international relationships . 
Equilibrium politics , traditionally labelled "balance of power politics, " for 
the Hobbesian means a calculated perception and deliberate management of 
all change variables that affect actors at the local, regional, and universal 
geographical levels of interaction . By resorting to a judicious concern and 
selection of techniques and strategies under the fluctuating conditions of the 
100 JouR AL OF POLITICAL CIE CE 
IPS , an approximate equilibdum of actors at each le el of int raction should 
ensue . Since actors are oriented towards a maximization of security , scalatory 
efforts by one must be met by an equal re ·pons from the other to preserve the 
equilibdum . Because of restraints built into sy t mic circumstances and the 
inherent limitations on the capabilities of every actor , the prospect for stand-
offs or deescalation of specific activities are always present, as long as the end 
result is th retention of an equilibrium . 
Approximate equilibrium in the IPS is identified by the Hobb sian with 
maximum actor control over ev nts and a diminution of conflictual r lation 
and its prospects. While never precluding reduced numbers and minor lev I 
of conflict , equilibrium politics negates the chance of a major conflagration as 
long as th equilibrium is consciously sustained. Th contemporary Hobbe-
sian , in contrast with earlier exponents , stresses that equilibrium cannot be 
attained or sustained as an automatic process or as some natural tendency at 
work in th universe. Ongoing positive commitment and choice is necessary 
to both achieve and sustain th balan e. 
Actual equilibrium formation and pres rvation can occur by such formal 
means as negotiations , or by such tacit means as unilateral inducements to 
obtain a qLtid pro quo response, or any combination of the two. Failure by 
actors to follow the prescriptions laid down by the Hobbesians I ads to 
"dis quilibrium ." This alternative condition becomes synonymous with gross 
conflictual behavior , multiplying instabilities , manifest insecurities, decline 
and eventual subordination by one actor of another. It is within the realm of 
choice of an actor to opt for a non-cooperative course of action or to veto others 
se king to create an equilibrium. When an approximate equilibrium already 
exi 'ts, non- ooperation then becomes a form of deviant behavior. Efforts to 
prevent the emergen e of an equilibrium in the first place are also labelled 
cl viant behavior. Usually such activities are associated with hegemonic aspi-
rations of an actor, which requires a response of equal or superior proportions 
by other actors to keep the threat to equilibrium in check. Where there is 
failure to react to such threats in time or adequately, then a superordination-
subordination pattern emerges between the actors. Hierarchical patt ms vary 
greatly becaus of the vari ty oft chniques that can be employed to achieve 
this relationship. Territorial occupation and governance by an outside actor is 
usually the most extreme version of such a subjugation. However it is not the 
automatic choice because the determination as to the most efficient ubordi-
nation pattern rests with the actor engaged in the subjugating function. 
Hierarchical patterns between various actors in the IPS are not avoidable. 
At any given moment the discrepanci s b twe n actors in terms of capabilities 
can be at great variance. Und rstood by the weaker actors as part of their 
capability calculation, it propels them into coalitions to enhance their e-
curity. Even voluntary membership in a coalition can mean a hierarchical 
pattern for the weaker actor. However , since equilibdum is dependent on all 
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its parts , even the weakest actor in a coalition has som e leve rage vis-a -vis the 
strongest actor. Voluntary association means the subordinated actor can disas-
sociate at opportune moments to join some other coalition to recreate the 
equilibrium in a somewhat different form. In these circumstances, the weak e r 
as well as the stronger actors , tend to agree that their vital interest in security 
based on a coalition serves as the best means to attain and sustain equilibrium . 
The Dichotomous Conceptions of the IPS:Th e Lockean View 
The other fundamental conception of the IPS , the Lockean View , can best 
be characterized as "Order in Search of More Order. " The underlying reason-
ing determining such a terminology is that on a continuum classification the 
IPS is currently accepted as predominantly organized . Though not totally void 
of anarchic tendencies, the Lockeans believe the IPS is moving towards more 
complete and effective organization. Additional and novel ordering efforts are 
conceived of as both likely and increasingly successful. This movement does 
not preclude setbacks, but they are viewed as temporary occurrences since 
the overall progressive development of the JPS is well established , if not 
irreversible. 
The invocation of Locke 's name is somewhat misleading because in norma-
tive political philosophy he ultimately accepts the imperfections of men in 
their relationships. Locke is therefore employed in this essay to denote one 
critical aspect of his political philosophy - his social contract theory is 
identified with the calculated ability of men to undertake and consummate 
orderly arrangements to control their relationships. Among the JPS theorists 
influenced by this viewpoint the emphases are on the growing integrative and 
cooperative relations between interacting actors transcending their internal 
jurisdictions . Usually the Lockean View is applied to the internal dynamics of 
a society, but the exponents have always felt it was equally applicable to the 
IPS , especially because of their acceptance of the linkage of intemalities and 
externalities. 
The Lockean View focuses on the ability of men to resolve their conflictual 
relationships, or at least to diminish them to a point of minor consequence in 
the total spectrum of human relations. Hobbesian concepts such as anarchy , 
primacy of flux, ungovernable by institutions, continuing contradictions, etc. , 
are unacceptable to their version of the JPS. This is largely attributable to a 
very optimistic conception of human nature - fundamentally or potentially 
rationalistic and as a consequence permitting highly cooperative behavior. In 
the Lockean View the present and future IPS, while evidencing continuity in 
many particulars, will eventually be radically different from the past. 
In contemporary analysis the Lockean View is more readily identified with 
"idealism " as an interpretation ofintemational politics. In the various writings 
of specialists, supporters and critics , synonyms such as "moralists, legalists , 
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functionalists futurists , etc ., "3 have been employed to identify this viewpoint 
for the student of the IPS. As noted earlier, in regards to the Hobbesians, 
readers should be aware that similarities in such views do not necessarily or 
adequately depict the Lockean View. Variations derived from the Lockean 
View of the IPS abound in current literature. 4 These exponents demand very 
careful scrutinization to avoid misconceptions about the core position of the 
Lockean View. 
In the American context , the Lockean View has dominated the intellectual 
tradition of interpreting the IPS and foreign relations. It has been most 
commonly found in the policies ofJeffersonians , Wilsonians , and the foreign 
policies of the Roosevelt " ew Deal. " This has been true whether the refer-
ence points have been periods of activism or inactivism in American external 
relations. The basic tenets of the Lockean View, as will be elaborated , have 
been utilized to explain and justify the choice of these diametrically opposed 
policy patterns for Americans or the world-at-large. 
The Lockean View of the contemporary IPS is best summarized in terms of 
three basic attributes , their corollary dynamics, and vita l ramifications: 1) an 
increasing coincidence and awareness of self- and mutal interests between 
actors ; 2) the growth of transnationalism and transactionalism as the major 
patterns of international relationships ; and 3) the prevalency of and increasing 
governance of international relationships. 
The increasing growth of self-and mutual interests between the actors in 
the IPS is attributed in the Lockean View to a combination of factors, essen-
tially the technological and communication revolutions. The technological 
revolution is recognized for both its intensification and acceleration of positive 
content and multilateral impacts on the actors in the IPS. The communication 
revolution , which is also seen in intensified and accelerated terms, is credited 
with the new transnational consciousness of the actors. either of these 
developments is conceived of as novel in the history of the relationships of 
men and their organized activities in any JPS. However , the Lockeans insist 
that the impacts of both revolutionary factors has led to the more recent 
triumph of the "necessity principle ," an indicator of a new urgency and 
paramountcy in current human relationships. Actors are viewed as being at a 
critical stage of interdependency that must foreclose anarchic and self-interest 
policies as damaging to everyone in the IPS. Problem intensities confronting 
actors have reached a frightening plateau that demands both their recognition 
and multilateral universal responses oriented to serving everyone's common 
needs. Particular focus is on the destructiveness of military and non-military 
technology and the inadequate responses to the existing economic and social 
interdependencies of the actors in the IPS. In the latter case the Lockeans 
3 Mitrany , Falk , Mendlovitz, Overseas Development Council , etc . 
4 Especially is this true for such views as neo -Marxism , ew Left revisionism , and 
isolationism . These respective views are substantially different from the Lockean in their em-
phasis on "non -activism " in a nation's foreign policy behavior, espcially for the United States. 
Their inward-directed orientation reflect a primacy of concern with radical or reform transforma-
tion of the society , despite its ramifications for the IPS . 
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specifically refer to the dangerous population-resource ratios, the ecological 
consequences of economic development, and the unstabilizing consequences 
of the failure of the underdeveloped world's modernization revolution. Sum-
marily the emphasis is on the dangers inhering for all in the "have not" nation 
predicaments. 
For the Lockean external and internal relationships are inextricably en-
twined. The fate and destiny of each actor is em bodied in each other's actions. 
The distinction between internalities and externalities are to the Lockean an 
artificial division since the domestic and international spheres are viewed as 
one jurisdiction and concern. The social consciousness of the Lockeans is 
epitomized in a paraphra e of Lincoln's famous remark "A world half deprived 
cannot long endure." 
For the Lockean the correct perception of the current trends in the IPS 
would lead to the assertion that the Hobbesian prescriptions will not meet the 
basic needs of the actors. A correct perception would encourage an ever-
increasing growth of transactional flows between the various actors. In tum 
this would evolve into trusting relationships and an eventual convergence of 
all interests and behavior. Such a convergence is understood by the Lockean 
to be coidentical with the predominance of the cooperative spirit and a careful 
delimitation of the acceptable modes for conducting any conflictual relation-
ships. At a particular point in this development of convergence, never spelled 
out by all Lockeans, the prospects of a major conflagration or a reversal of the 
transnational integrative pattern would become impossible. 
As part of the verification of the developments and expectations within the 
IPS, the Lockeans devote considerable descriptive efforts to "the growth of 
transnationalism and transactionalism as the major patterns in international 
relationships." Although acknowledging such an evolution as evident time 
immemorial in international relationships, the intensity and acceleration 
taking place in today's IPS is heavily accentuated among the current Loc-
keans. 
A variety of causal and explanatory factors are introduced to substantiate 
these developments. The communication revolution not only makes peoples 
aware of one another, but it serves as a basis of transmitting values that lead to 
an acculturation process among the impacted peoples. Ultimately it results in 
a universal recognition of commonly shared problems and similar solutions for 
them. The technological revolution, as a dynamic in its own right, creates 
common problems and offers similar opportunities and solutions for all the 
actors. In addition to these two variables at work, there is also a cross-national 
fertilization of views and values taking place because of the large transmigra-
tion of humanity over the entire globe. Out of this event comes a further 
acculturation process whereby populations increasingly share and act out a 
common value system. The three developments simultaneously complement 
and reenforce one another in evolving the IPS in the direction anticipated by 
the Lockeans. 
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With the novel consciousness of populations , a whole new set of loyalti es 
and authoritative decision-making centers emerge as central to the workings 
of the IPS. Each problem , reflecting a transnational need as oppo ed to a 
particular actor's n eds, generates organizations and leaders oriented to these 
specific concerns. Some Lockeans envision a d velopmental progression , 
either actual and/or desirabl , citing a regional orientation as a prior tep 
towards a full-scale universal orientation. Such distinctions as found among 
Lockeans , while not undercutting their core concepts, indicate a range of 
views exists. Th emergence and growth of the transnational-problem-
oriented organizations and leaders provides an additional mechanism for the 
eventual socialization of p oples in the direction of the integrative develop-
ments . 
The ultimate expectation of the Lockeans is that the evolving functional 
areas, such as economic, social, technological, etc., will have a spillover effect 
resulting in a political institutional integration pattern. The latter occurrence 
would be viewed by the Lockeans as the culminating and most comprehensive 
fulfillment of human relationships in the JPS. 
It is in regards to the third basic attribute, the governance of international 
politics , that the Lock ans expend their greatest effort. Reflective of their 
optimistic outlook , the disposition towards futuristic expectations, and th 
n ed to provide a better IPS, the Lockeans are uniformly preoccupied with 
the blueprinting of "social contracts" that fulfill these anticipations. The 
prevailing view is that the IPS is well organized, but lacking at pr sent in both 
the scope and intensity of policies essential to a most efficient operation in 
behalf of its affected populations. Empirical data are usually presented to 
support the organized aspects of the present and imm diate past IPS . Most 
particularly are they employed to support the Lockean contention of th 
increasing progression towards the organization and governance of the IPS . 
o less than five5 "social contracts" are di cernible among Lockeans as 
having been historically operationaliz d for the governance of the IP . All of 
them are traceable backwards into the distant past , additional proof that a 
progressive development towards an ultimate scenario has been taking place. 
The five "social contracts," each expressive of a specific aspiration of men , are 
linked in the Lockean View as either a pre-condition or complementary 
reenforcement for one another. Therefore no priority is attached by the 
Lockeans to any single social contract , although misguided dogmatists have 
misled students of the IPS by their stress on one to the exclusion of the others. 
They are all viewed as essential and contributory to the overall dynamic of the 
increasing organization and governance of the IPS. 
One of the social contracts is popularly referred to as "international law," a 
system of rules on the rights and duties of states towards each other. Some 
5The number varies among Lockeans according to each ones emphases and analyses. Thus 
the social contract labelled intergovernmental organizations (ICO 's) splits into a universal and/or 
regional variation for different Lockeans. Similar examples exist for other social contracts. 
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Lockeans trace the content from both the Roman concept of "ius gen ti um (the 
law of the people )" and their adaptation of "ius naturale (the natural law)" from 
the Greeks. The more common starting point to demonstrate the lengthy 
influence of modern day international law has been Hugo Grotius in the 17th 
century. 
More recently Lockeans have sought to expand the application of these 
essential standards downward to govern the behavior of individuals . Some 
Lockeans have accepted the best prospect for progressive development lies in 
the prior evolution oflegal precepts based on regional cultural and geographi-
cal factors. The universal impulse has been reliant on the further growth of 
international law through various complementary means such as: 1) the 
United Nations ' International Law Commission; 2) law-making treaties ; 3) 
adjudication and advisory opinions of the International Court ofJ ustice; 4) the 
use of the equity concept of ex aequo et bona ; and 5) pacific settlement of 
disputes. Success for this social contract has been based on the existence of 
prior and evolving legal principles as the criteria for judging and controlling 
actor behavior in the IPS. 
A second social contract , exercising both a restraining influence as well as 
promoting more governance of the IPS , can be labelled "international moral-
ity and world public opinion. " In the case of international morality, the 
Lockeans focus on the growth and intensification of a consensus of ethical 
values among the peoples of the world. The progressive development of a 
mutuality of attitudes, beliefs and aspiratfons is attributed to the combined 
communications-technological revolutions and other cross-national fertiliza-
tion factors already mentioned. Because of their belief in a growing consensus 
of values , a regional and/or universal consciousness merges which focusses on 
the achievement of common goals. As a substantive development , the Loc-
keans perceive of the community idea as a precursor and/or reenforcer of 
further institutional and legal principle formation while simultaneously creat-
ing criteria by which to judge and control activities in the IPS . 
The closely related concept of "world public opinion " is viewed by Loc-
keans primarily as a restraining force on actor policies. Although recognizing 
considerable diversities in public opinion on a daily basis, the Lockeans feel 
that world public opinion has progressed to the point of indicating what is 
intolerable as well as permissable by actors in the contemporary IPS. The 
major vehicle for operationalizing world public opinion has become the 
United Nations in general and the General Assembly and Secretary-General 
specifically. The restraining dynamic is carried out by appeals to mass publics 
over the heads of state or to selectively transnational and influential opinion 
elites in each society. In these mechanics lies a Lockean recognition that there 
is a vital linkage between the internal and external behavior of any actor. 
A third social contract, reflecting the pervasiveness and increasing gover-
nance of the IPS , is the "arms control/disarmament movement. " To the 
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Lockeans , history is replete with spasmodic and continuing efforts at both 
general disarmament and control agreements. Although the ultimate inclina-
tion is towards total disarmament , elimination of all armed forces and arms , 
there has been considerable accommodation to a prerequisite step of arms 
control , the partial reduction and/or stabilization of anns and force levels. It is 
only by these means that human and physical resources are emancipated for 
other Lockean expectatfons. 
The Lockeans view the current period in history , the nuclear age , an 
urgency unparalleled in previous times . While urging more rapid develop-
ments in a general disarmament , they emphasize the evolving arms control 
progress as proof of this ultimate direction in the IPS. The progressive thesis of 
the continuity and consistency of the arms control/disarmament movement 
tends to begin with the Hague Conferences at the turn of the 19th-20th 
centuries. Then they go on to insist that there has been an acceleration and 
intensification of the movement since World War Two by citing a vast array of 
specifics, especially in the nuclear weapons control field. 
The fourth social contract , "intergovernmental organizations (IGO 's)," 
have been particularly attractive to the "free world have nations " and the 
"third-fourth world have-not nations. " Both groups have been optimistic as to 
the possibilities of such an approach achieving increased improvement and 
stability for the underdeveloped actors, a reg uirement for a better functioning 
IPS . 
The lengthy history of the "international public union movement ," the 
modem version of which originated in the 19th century , has become a 
world-wide economic and social functionalism movement in the post-World 
War Two period. The Lockeans view functionalism and neo-functionalism as a 
building-block process whereby cooperation in economic and social affairs 
intensifies a community consciousness regionally and world-wide. 
The functionalists stress the transnational nature of the economic and 
social problems besetting the peoples of the IPS , thus demanding a coordi-
nated and organized supranational attack on them to achieve effectiveness. 
The · vehicle for this assault is the IGO , although there are also non-
governmental organizations engaged in a complementary effort. The creation 
and further growth of the IGO's represents a progressive development to-
wards a common horizontal problem resolution basic to all men , the growth of 
habitual cooperation , and an increasing governance of relationships in the 
IPS. Every aspect of human endeavor is viewed as vital and susceptible to 
organization as well as cooperation. The cooperative spirit is assumed to have 
transferability from one activity to another , including politics , producing an 
accelerating impact in the IPS. The ultimate expectation is that these proces-
ses will lead to a political community consciousness and organization parallel-
ing the horizontal economic and social activity patterns . For the Lockean the 
final proof lies in the vast multiplication of regional and universal IGO' s 
exercising an increasing jurisdiction over virtually every human activity . 
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The fifth social contract takes the form of "collective security systems" 
operating in the IPS. The basic requirements and expectations are that the 
actors will join in a formal system, cooperate as a unified group in the face of a 
potential or actual common danger of aggression, and thereby maximize their 
individual security as the pay off. The formal aspect, a regional and/or univer -
sal organization, provides the actors the means to keep abreast of the current 
or emerging dangers inhering in the IPS. It also affords the actors a continuous 
decision-making and implementation apparatus to deal effectively with these 
dangers. The actors are expected to subordinate their narrow self-interests to 
an overriding group interest of preserving their mutual security. Prior com-
mitments to this goal sets up a situation whereby the deviant actor would not 
likely challenge the combined strengths of the group. In this situation the 
collectivity becomes identifiable as the moral and legal will of the world 
community, a powerful deterring force in the IPS . If an actor persists in 
violating existing norms , the group via the organization's mechanics , activates 
a coercive action against the aggressor to restore the status quo ante. 
For the Lockean the collective security idea has been the major innovation 
of the 20th century. Starting with the imperfect League of Nations, it has been 
superseded by the United ations, an improved and constantly evolving 
version of the original idea. Optimism as to its growth and effectiveness are 
derived from the additions of regional collective security systems. The sub-
sequent techniques of "preventive diplomacy " and "peacekeeping opera-
tions " add to the vision of collective security as an adaptive and innovative 
approach to increasing the governance of the IPS. The emergence of a 
third-fourth world dominance in the United Nations as a whole and in the 
General Assembly specifically generates the feeling that international stan-
dards, regulatory behavior , and diminished independence of Great Powers 
are taking over the IPS. Continued application of collective security 
mechanics is supposed to enhance habitual cooperation and the pacific format 
for conducting the relationships between all peoples and nations in the IPS. 
Conclusion 
The author has deliberately avoided rendering a critique of these two basic 
views of the IPS despite their vulnerabilities. The effort would require a 
separate essay of equal or greater length. Much of the debate today in 
academic and official circles really revolve around the strengths and weaknes-
ses of these two views, usually activated by specific events and/or policy 
choices. Too often the coherent aspects and the unstated assumptions are 
missing in these debates. This essay has sought to close the gap by providing a 
systematic, but brief overview, by which to follow and analyze such controver-
sies. As part of this objective, a summa,y table is presented by which to 
compare and contrast the respective views. Like all such efforts, it must resort 
to oversimplifications. 
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An Abbrevia ted Comparison of Two Basic Concep tion s of the IPS Contr ast s 
Att ribute Hobhesians Lockeans 
atur e of Me n 
Int ern al Actor 
Dynamics 
Ex tern al Syste m 
Co nditi ons 
Presc ripti ons 
E xpec tations 
changes 
Ove rall Outl ook 
Se lf-int eres t o rient ed 
Du al natu re (rational 
& irr ational) 
Prim ar ily co mp etiti ve 
Eliti st (expe rti se) 
re liance 
Public op inion se ts 
tole rab le limit s 
Perm anance of socia l 
conflict 
Con flict managea ble 
Prim ar ily plu ra listic 
& di verse arena 
Mora lity in acto r's 
pr ese rvation 
a. Int ern al ly-
de rived p rece pt s 
Verti ca lly-or ie nt ed 
loya lty patt e rn s 
(nationalism ) 
Eq uili b rium po litics 
(blance of power } 
Ca uti ous and de limit ed 
risk-taking (inh e re nt 
limit ations) 
Mult iple tec hniq ues 
e mpl oye d are int er-
de pe nd ent 
a. ultim a ratio-
viole nce capabil -
ities 
Systemic changes are 
in speci fics 
a. Incre me nt al 
(tr ansform ation) 
Co ntinuit y of imp e rfec t 
syste m 
a. Retenti on of 
co nt radictions 
& mutu aliti es 
Stabilit y a short run 
ph enome non 
a. In stab ilit y long 
run ph e nome non 
Conflict form s and tec h-
niqu es in flux 
Pess imi sm to res tr ained 
optimi sm 
Socia l-int eres t or ient ed 
Pr edomin antl y ra tional 
Prim ar ily coo pera tive 
Popul ar will e mb odi es 
wisdom 
Pu blic opini on is th e 
de te rminin g force 
Co ntr ol of social 
co nflict at 
inco nseq ue ntial leve ls 
Prim arily shared com mon-
alities 
Universa l and pe rvas ive 
morality 
a. Ex te rnally-
der ived p rece pt s 
Hor izont ally-orie nt ed 
loya lty patt e rn s 
(fun ctionalism) 
Institution and value-
for mation po litics 
(imple men t uni formit ies ) 
Grea t and unlimit ed 
risk-taking (necess ity 
prin ciple) 
Mul ti ple techniqu es 
e mpl oye d are both di stin ct 
and int e rde pend e nt 
a. ultim a ra tio-
eco nomic capab il-
ities 
Systemic changes are 
total istic 
a. Radi ca l changes 
App roxi mation of pe rfec t 
syste m 
a. Co nve rge nce to a 
domin ance of 
mut alities 
Prog ress a short run 
ph enomenon (instabilit y) 
a. Stabili ty a long 
ru n ph e nome non 
Co nflict form s and tech-
niqu e stabili zed 
Optimi sm 
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Similariti es 
l. The IP S is compri sed of a variety of nee ds that produ ce a multiplicity of relationships, 
possible and actual. 
2. The functional inte rdependence of actors (or coalitions) links the inte rnal-external be-
havior with others. 
3. Fun ctional int erdependence prec ludes the policy option of inte rnalization ofint ernalities 
(isolationism). 
4. Fun ctional interdependence and nee d fulfillment dict ates some form of collaborative 
activities . 
5. Conflict in the !PS is manageable und er specific circumstances (which vary howeve r 
be twee n the two views) as a ze ro-sum game. 
6. Techni ques of violence (milit ary particularly) in the contemporary JPS are inherently 
delimited by their very technology and spatial application s. 
7. Failure to instigate prop er presc ripti ve behavior, althou gh diffe rent for each conception 
of the JPS, leads to a non-zero sum game, with systemic breakdown and pessimistic pay offs. 
